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1. History of EU-Turkey Relations1 
1.1. Widespread support for Turkish EU-membership 
Since the European Council in Helsinki recognized Turkey as a candidate country for EU 
membership in 1999, Italian governments have been generally supportive and often enthusiastic 
of TuƌkeǇ͛s EU ďid. “tƌoŶg eĐoŶoŵiĐ ties ďoŶd the tǁo ĐouŶtƌies: ItalǇ is ĐuƌƌeŶtlǇ TuƌkeǇ͛s 
fourth biggest trade partner, while Italian investors consider Turkey an attractive market. 
Overall, the trade balance has been in favour of Italy, with exports rising at USD 10.6 million in 
2015 and the trade surplus of Italy at USD 3.7 million for the same year. Additionally, in 2015 
Italian investment continued growing, with 1,300 companies and firms operating in Turkey. 
EĐoŶoŵiĐ iŶteƌests aƌe so stƌoŶg that soŵe spoke of aŶ ͞eĐoŶoŵiĐ loďďǇ͟ adǀoĐatiŶg foƌ 
TuƌkeǇ͛s aĐĐession to the EU. Moreover, Italy has traditionally looked at transatlantic and 
European integrations as mutually reinforcing trends. Cooperation with Turkey has been 
ĐoŶsideƌed ĐƌuĐial to stƌeŶgtheŶ tƌaŶsatlaŶtiĐ ties also iŶ the light of AŶkaƌa͛s ĐoŶtƌiďution to 
Western security. As far as political stakeholders are concerned, there are some differences in 
the political spectrum as for the rhetoric used to advocate Turkey joining the EU. While centre-
right parties have traditionally put emphasis on economic and strategic factors, centre-left 
parties makes use of the rhetoric on Turkey being a bridge towards the Middle East, not only in 
economic and strategic terms, but also culturally speaking. Another factor underlined by the 
Italian centre-left is that of the ĐoŵŵoŶ ͞MediteƌƌaŶeaŶ ideŶtitǇ͟ of ItalǇ aŶd TuƌkeǇ, ĐoŵďiŶed 
ǁith the faĐt that TuƌkeǇ͛s aĐĐessioŶ to the EU ŵight haǀe the positiǀe effeĐt of shiftiŶg the 
EuƌopeaŶ UŶioŶ͛s foĐus fƌoŵ east to south.  
The widespread support notwithstanding, there are still some significant sources of skepticism. 
OŶ the ƌight of the ItaliaŶ politiĐal speĐtƌuŵ, ŵaŶǇ paƌties oppose TuƌkeǇ͛s ŵeŵďeƌship oŶ the 
basis of cultural, identity and religious reason. The Northern Lega (Lega Nord, LN) is perhaps the 
most vocal in opposiŶg TuƌkeǇ͛s EuƌopeaŶ ďid: the ƌegioŶalist, ǆeŶophoďiĐ, aŶd eurosceptic 
party bases its argument on religious and identity matters. While firmly declaring that Turkey is 
not culturally, socially and geographically a European country, leaders of the LN have threatened 
to call for a referendum if Turkey was ever successful in completing its access negotiations. On 
the opposite side of the politiĐal speĐtƌuŵ, soŵe left paƌties ĐƌitiĐize TuƌkeǇ͛s pooƌ deŵoĐƌatiĐ 
record and the minority rights violations going on in the country in particular against the Kurdish 
minority in the south-east. Finally, the presence of the Vatican City had an influence on the 
Italian positions on EU-TuƌkeǇ͛s ƌelatioŶs. ‘elatioŶs ďetǁeeŶ TuƌkeǇ aŶd the VatiĐaŶ haǀe ďeeŶ 
generally positiǀe siŶĐe Pope BeŶediĐt XVI͛s ǀisit iŶ ϮϬϬ6; hoǁeǀeƌ, ItalǇ͛s stƌoŶg ties ǁith the 
Catholic Church has clear influence on the so-called ͞Christian public opinion͟ in the country. 
                                                          
1
 The EU 28 Country Reports were completed before the Turkish Constitutional Referendum on 16 April 2017. 
Thus, the report does not take account of any potential changes in the national debate that might have 
occurred in the meantime. 
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Although this section of the public opinion has been highly divided so far, it could be the basis 
foƌ a laƌge ͞Ŷo-Turkey-in-the-European-UŶioŶ͟ ŵoǀeŵeŶt. IŶ ƌeĐeŶt Ǉeaƌs, polls registered a 
decrease in positive opinion on Turkey among both the elites and the public opinion. Turkish 
growing authoritarian government and religious radicalization confirmed the fears of some 
sectors of the public opinion; besides, opposition against Muslim migration, combined with the 
raise of populist movements in Europe resulted in scepticism being on the rise. 
1.2. Cultural and identity issues dominate the public debate 
When discussing Turkey and its relations with the EU, identity issues together with value-based 
discussions dominate the debate in Italy. Pro-Turkey arguments, in particular the economic one, 
have so far kept political sceptics restrained, but could not neutralize doubts among the Italian 
public opinion. General sceptical patterns toward Turkey follow cultural and identity concerns: 
TuƌkeǇ is still peƌĐeiǀed as aŶ iŵpoƌtaŶt ͞otheƌ͟, paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ ǁheŶ it Đoŵes to Euƌope alleged 
Christian identity. Christianity is perceived not only as a religion, but also as a cultural marker 
that pƌoǀides ǁith a keǇ to iŶteƌpƌet Euƌope͛s politiĐal futuƌe. Cultuƌal aŶd ƌeligious issues aƌe 
comparatively more important in Italy than in other EU countries when it comes to European 
enlargement. These sources of resistance and opposition from public opinion reflect on some 
media outlets. Information on Turkey in the Italian media is scarce, ill-informed and often 
influenced by stereotypical views. Numerous studies over Italian coverage of Turkey have found 
out that it is in the news only when something internationally relevant happens, rather than 
there being an ongoing debate on Turkey. 
1.3. Interest-based discussion dominates the debate at political level  
There is a marked gap between the political elites and the public opinion – i.e. public-elite 
opiŶioŶ Đleaǀage ǁheŶ it Đoŵes to disĐussiŶg TuƌkeǇ͛s ƌeleǀaŶĐe foƌ the EU. WheŶ disĐussiŶg the 
main policy areas key to EU-Turkey relations, an interest-based discussion dominates the debate 
at political and government level. Besides economic considerations, Turkey is still perceived as a 
strategic partner to ensure the stability and security of the Mediterranean and an important 
energy-hub. Increasingly more due to the iŶstaďilitǇ of the Middle East, TuƌkeǇ͛s geo-political 
value has become that of a reliable partner, although this might change in the near future due to 
TuƌkeǇ͛s iŶteƌŶal iŶstaďilitǇ. OŶ the otheƌ haŶd, the ItaliaŶ puďliĐ is keeŶeƌ oŶ the Đultuƌal and 
identity differences between Turkey and the EU. Although utilitarian calculations of the costs 
aŶd ďeŶefits of eŶlaƌgeŵeŶt ŵight plaǇ a ƌole iŶ shapiŶg ItaliaŶ puďliĐ͛s opiŶioŶ oŶ TuƌkeǇ, 
identity-based concerns have a greater role in fueling Turcoscepticism.    
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2. Future of EU-Turkey relations 
2.1. Italy is concerned with Turkey’s growing authoritarianism 
In recent years, the growing authoritarianism in Turkey combined with a perceived Islamic 
radicalization in the country contributed to exacerbate concerns among political and economic 
stakeholders. Particulary after the July 2016 attempted coup, the Italian government joined 
other European leaders in expressing solidarity with Ankara, while calling on Ankara to ensure 
democracy and the rule of law in the country. Notwithstanding significant differences according 
to political and ideological orientation, even the centre-left, historically more inclined to support 
TuƌkeǇ͛s ďid to the EuƌopeaŶ UŶioŶ, ǀoiĐed ĐoŶĐeƌŶ oǀeƌ the deteƌioƌated situatioŶ iŶ TuƌkeǇ. 
Gianni Pittella, member of the European Parliament with the Democratic Party (Partito 
Democratico, PD) was among the proponents of the November 2016 motion to the European 
PaƌliaŵeŶt to fƌeeze aĐĐessioŶ talks ǁith TuƌkeǇ to ĐoŶdeŵŶ the Tuƌkish goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s 
disproportional repressive measures; he declared that the EU institutions could not give a blind 
eye anymore to violations committed by Ankara. The 5 Star Movement (Movimento 5 Stelle, 
M5S) and LN expressed similar views, although in a much more radical way. The key concerns of 
the ItaliaŶ politiĐal elites ƌegaƌd ŵaiŶlǇ TuƌkeǇ͛s huŵaŶ ƌights ǀiolatioŶs in the Kurdish 
populated area and the growing authoritarianism of its government, in particular in the light of 
AŶkaƌa͛s effoƌts to pass a PƌesideŶtial sǇsteŵ. IŶ additioŶ, also the ͞eĐoŶoŵiĐ loďďǇ͟ folloǁs 
with concern the deteriorating situation in the country and the political instability that could 
sooŶ eŶough iŵpaĐt its eĐoŶoŵiĐ gƌoǁth. TuƌkeǇ͛s doŵestiĐ issues ĐoŶtƌiďuted to a ĐeŶtƌifugal 
rhetoric, marking a slight convergence between the position of the political-economic elite and 
that of the population as a whole.  
2.2. Turkey as a strategic partner 
Italian political and economic elites consider Turkey a ͞strategic partner͟; however, the concept 
of differentiated integration, which Italian scholars have debated in the past years, does not 
feature as an ongoing debate among political elites. Recent events in the EU might soon change 
this. The Brexit vote sparked off a debate in the EU and in Italy on the future asset of relations 
with the UK. If the UK became a model for a differentiated integration, it might pave the way for 
a similar arrangement with Turkey. In addition, this concept might feature in the near future 
should EU-Turkey relations further deteriorate.  
2.3. A chance of a nationalistic closure and growth in Turkoscepticism 
In 2015, after a long period of growing mistrust and estrangement, the migration crisis reminded 
the EU of the geo-strategic importance of Turkey and cooperation over migration management 
determined a rapprochement between the two. Although the Italian government does not have 
great beneficial interests in the EU-Turkey deal on migration management, Rome welcomed it as 
a positive step to the rapprochement between the two and to the reopening of EU-Turkey 
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negotiations. As far as Italy is concerned, Turkey is as a strategic partner in migration 
management rather than an origin country for migrants; the issue of Turkish migration is 
perceived in Italy less than in other countries such as Germany, where the Turkish community is 
much greater. However, migration from Turkey is an issue as far as Italians perceive it as a 
migration from a Muslim majority country. According to the 2015 Eurobarometer survey, the top 
important issue facing the EU according to Italian citizens is immigration and 50% is against 
further enlargement of the EU. Security concerns and the fear of irregular migration, in 
paƌtiĐulaƌ the Musliŵ oŶe, ǁeƌe ǁell plaǇed ďǇ those politiĐal foƌĐes that aƌe opposiŶg TuƌkeǇ͛s 
bid to the European Union.  
Besides the migration crisis, some Turkish domestic events affected the debate on EU-Turkey 
relations. The Republic of Turkey is at a crucial stage in its history: the Justice and Development 
PaƌtǇ ;Adalet ǀe KalkıŶŵa Paƌtisi, AKPͿ, tƌusted ďǇ the EU aŵoŶg otheƌs to ŵake TuƌkeǇ a 
trustworthy partner in the Middle East, is becoming increasingly authoritarian. After the 
attempted military coup of July 2016, the government implemented severe purges, jailing 
thousands among public servants, military personnel, members of the judiciary, academicians, 
and journalists. As mentioned above, these Turkish domestic developments are severely 
worrying the Italian political elites and public opinion. There was some tension between Ankara 
aŶd ‘oŵe iŶ the suŵŵeƌ ϮϬϭ6, due to ‘eĐep TaǇǇip EƌdoğaŶ͛s aĐĐusatioŶ oǀeƌ aŶ ItaliaŶ 
investigation into accusations that his son Bilal laundered money. Prime Minister Matteo Renzi 
reacted firmly, declaring that Italy has an independent legal system and its judges answer to the 
Italian constitution, not to the Turkish president. 
As far as Italy is concerned, the country is still struggling to get out of the economic crisis: it is 
suffering from slow economic growth and high unemployment rate, in particular among younger 
generations. The political situation does not seem to be in a better shape, with the negative vote 
on the constitutional referendum and Matteo Renzi resigning, there is a high chance of early 
elections. The rise of populist movements in Europe has been mirrored by the raise of the M5S, 
which has drawn together the malcontent and might pose a serious challenge to the now-in-
power Democratic Party (Partito Democratico, PD). These changes might result in an overall 
nationalistic closure of the Italian society, with a consequent growth in Turkoscepticism.  
3. EU-Turkey Relations and the Neighbourhood/Global scene 
3.1. Italy-Turkey position in the global scene 
TuƌkeǇ͛s stƌategiĐ sigŶifiĐaŶĐe ƌeǀeals eŶeƌgetiĐallǇ iŶ tiŵes of politiĐal ĐhaŶges aŶd ĐoŶfliĐt iŶ 
the neighbourhood, due to its unique geopolitical position. Conflicts in Ukraine and the Caucasus 
did Ŷot ĐhaŶge ItalǇ͛s ǀieǁs oŶ TuƌkeǇ͛s ƌole aŶd its ƌelatioŶs ǁith the EU: AŶkaƌa aŶd ‘oŵe 
ĐoŶdeŵŶed ‘ussiaŶ͛s aŶŶeǆatioŶ of Cƌiŵea aŶd ƌeĐogŶized Geoƌgia͛s teƌƌitoƌial iŶtegƌitǇ. The 
warming up of ƌelatioŶs ďetǁeeŶ MosĐoǁ aŶd AŶkaƌa iŶ the past Ǉeaƌ did Ŷot ĐhaŶge TuƌkeǇ͛s 
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stand on these issues, or those on the security in the Black Sea. On the other hand, the position 
of Italy and Turkey is often – but not always – divergent for conflicts in the MENA region. As far 
as the Middle East is concerned, Italy has historically followed the US initiatives while Turkey 
ƌespoŶded iŶ a ŵuĐh ŵoƌe Đoŵpleǆ ǁaǇ. “iŶĐe the theŶ FoƌeigŶ MiŶisteƌ Ahŵet Daǀutoğlu 
elaďoƌated the ͞zeƌo pƌoďleŵs͟ stƌategiĐ doĐtƌiŶe, Turkey worked to develop positive relations 
with neighboring countries such as Syria, Iraq, Iran and the Arab world in general. Although the 
Aƌaď spƌiŶgs ĐhalleŶged this stƌategǇ, ŵaŶǇ still see a shift iŶ TuƌkeǇ͛s Middle East poliĐǇ, Ŷot 
clearly linked, if Ŷot deliŶked fƌoŵ, its peƌsistiŶg WesteƌŶ/EuƌopeaŶ stƌategiĐ pƌioƌities. TuƌkeǇ͛s 
decision to intervene in the Syrian quagmire might confirm this trend. Critics of Turkey in Italy 
and in other European member states see this shift as a manifestation of what many call 
TuƌkeǇ͛s Ŷeo-ottomanism – i.e. a new foreign policy that allegedly promotes a greater 
engagement within regions formerly under the rule of the Ottoman Empire, motivated by 
Muslim solidarity and a re-appƌeĐiatioŶ of TuƌkeǇ͛s IslaŵiĐ ǀoĐatioŶ. Differences in the approach 
to conflicts in the Middle East notwithstanding, Italian and Turkish positions converge on some 
conflicts in North Africa. In war-torn Libya, Ankara and Rome agree on recognizing the 
Government of National Accord of Prime Minister Fayez al-Serraj as the sole authority in the 
country, and participate in the UN Support Mission. 
3.2. A potential of strategic cooperation in the Mediterranean  
Rome and Ankara have a multidimensional cooperation relationship that many Italian politicians 
desĐƌiďe as a ͞stƌategiĐ paƌtŶeƌship͟, ďased oŶ tǁo ŵaiŶ pillaƌs: EuƌopeaŶisŵ aŶd AtlaŶtiĐisŵ. 
Cooperation within NATO translated into several joint missions while providing with a common 
strategic and political view. Another important dimension of this relationship is that of the 
Mediterranean. Cooperation in the Euro-Mediterranean area is of extreme importance for the 
two countries to ensure its stability and security.  
Italy and Turkey can effectively cooperate in the Mediterranean dimension to manage migration 
flows in particular in this period of crisis. This translates in border security cooperation to stem 
irregular flows of migration and target organized criminal and smuggling networks. Economy and 
trade is another important dimension of cooperation between Ankara and Rome; as discussed 
aďoǀe, theƌe is a high leǀel of iŶteƌpeŶetƌatioŶ of the tǁo͛s eĐoŶoŵies. FiŶallǇ Ǉet iŵpoƌtaŶtlǇ, 
energy is becoming a major area of cooperation: the transport of natural gas to Italy via Turkey 
has increased in volume in the last years. The construction of the Trans Atlantic Pipeline will 
further increase the relevance of Turkey-Italy cooperation in this sector.  
3.3. Global issues might challenge this partnership 
In the years following the Arab Spring, Turkey was considered in the EU and in Italy as a model of 
democracy and of a moderate Muslim country. However, this might be rapidly changing not only 
due to TuƌkeǇ͛s doŵestiĐ eǀeŶts ďut also ďeĐause of its alleged Ŷeǁ foƌeigŶ poliĐǇ ageŶda. The 
Italian government ǁelĐoŵed TuƌkeǇ͛s ƌeŶeǁed ƌelatioŶs ǁith Isƌael, aŶd the ǁarming up of 
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relations between Moscow and Ankara does not seem to have changed the Turkish 
goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s staŶĐe oŶ its alliaŶĐe ǁith NATO. Hoǁeǀeƌ, the ƋuestioŶ oŶ ǁetheƌ TuƌkeǇ is 
saying bye to the West, and in particular to the EU, to look for other alliances is yet to be 
answered.  
While Turkey and the EU/Italy have a strong bilateral and multilateral partnership in several 
neighbouring regions, a different geopolitical focus might drift their strategic projection apart. In 
the midst of several domestic and global challenges, EU-Turkey cooperation might be tested in 
the near future. The current situation in the Middle East and in particular in Syria will play a 
ŵajoƌ ƌole iŶ shapiŶg TuƌkeǇ͛s ƌelations with the EU in the near future. The war in Syria is 
connected to proxy issues followed with concern in Italy, such as the migrant crisis and the 
terrorist threat. Growing security concerns in the EU and Italy might represent an occasion for 
Turkey to be confirmed – or not – as a strategic partner. This making or breaking stage of EU-
Turkey relations might also shape the Italian perception of it at both political-economical and 
public level.  
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